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Abstract 
How does the framing of immigration influence support for the welfare state? Drawing 
on research from psychology, specifically the notion of negativity bias and the 
sequencing of negative and positive information, we argue that negative immigration 
frames undermine welfare support, while positive frames have little or no effect. 
Individuals take less notice of positive frames and the effect of such frames is further 
undermined by the previous exposure to negative frames, which tend to stick longer in 
people’s minds. Our findings, based on survey experiments on over 9,000 individuals in 
Germany, Sweden and the UK, show a strong and pervasive effect of negative framing of 
immigration on welfare support. We also find some evidence that this effect is further 
amplified for people who hold anti-immigrant and anti-welfare attitudes or feel 
economically insecure. The effect of positive framing is considerably weaker and does 
not strengthen welfare support in any of our countries.  
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Introduction 
 
In recent years immigration has become a salient issue in public debates in Europe. In 
no small part this is related to a substantial increase in immigration that most affluent 
European countries have experienced since 1990. In most of these countries, the 
proportion of the population that is foreign-born has increased considerably during this 
period, while the recent refugee crisis has further added to these pressures.  
This rising immigration has had profound effects on politics in Europe. The 
discourse of far-right parties has increasingly emphasized the negative consequences of 
immigration for the economy and society (Afonso and Rennwald, 2018; Stockemer and 
Barisone, 2017). Not only has this trend been linked to the electoral success of extreme 
right parties (Ivarsflaten 2008), but it has also reconfigured mainstream politics as 
parties have tried to respond to growing concerns about immigration (Abou-Chadi 
2016; Abou-Chadi and Krause 2018). One of those concerns, which has figured 
prominently in the media and political discourse, is the potential consequences of 
immigration for the welfare state. Political actors and the media have focused heavily on 
the fiscal effects of immigration, namely the question of the net impact of immigration 
on public finances.  
Consequently, citizens have been exposed to conflicting messages with some 
sources claiming that immigrants are a drain on public finances, while others arguing 
that immigrants’ net contribution is positive. What are the consequences of this debate 
for public opinion on the welfare state? Does the exposure to negative frames of 
immigration undermine support for the welfare state, and do positive frames have the 
opposite effect? 
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Existing literature on the link between immigration and the welfare state does 
not offer a direct answer to this question because it focuses predominantly on the 
effects of the scale of immigration (e.g. Alesina & Glaeser, 2004; Brady and Finningan, 
2014; Finseraas, 2008), rather than of the framing of its costs and benefits. The general 
literature on framing is helpful in so far as it tells us that people tend to respond to 
frames (e.g. Chong & Druckman, 2007b; Haynes et al, 2016), but its focus on issue 
frames does not offer clear insights into the question of how clearly valenced frames 
(i.e. outlining positive or negative aspects) influence public opinion. This paper aims to 
contribute to both of these literatures by focussing on the microfoundations of the 
relationship between immigration and the welfare state. Information on immigration is 
hardly ever presented in fully neutral terms and even information on the stock or flows 
of immigrants is often communicated through partisan lenses. If we want to understand 
how immigration affects welfare support, we need to turn our attention to how citizens 
process this information and how in turn this affects their welfare policy preferences.  
To this end, we draw on the literature from psychology, and specifically research 
on negativity bias (Kahnemann & Tversky, 1979; Rozin and Royzman, 2001) and the 
sequencing of negative and positive information (Ledgerwood & Boydstun, 2014; 
Boydstun et al, 2017; Sparks & Ledgerwood, 2017). In line with this literature, we 
hypothesize that negative frames regarding the impact of immigration undermine 
welfare support, while positive frames have little or no effect. Individuals take less 
notice of positive frames and the effect of such frames can be further undermined by 
previous exposure to negative frames, which tend to stick longer in people’s minds. 
We test this hypothesis using survey experiments on over 9,000 individuals in 
Germany, Sweden and the UK. We focus on these countries for two reasons. First, in 
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each case, a substantial proportion of the population is foreign-born (12-15%) and the 
costs and benefits of immigration have been the subject of heated political debates in 
recent times. In the UK, immigration was a key issue in debates leading up to the EU 
Referendum and the subsequent negotiations on the terms of Brexit. In Germany and 
Sweden concerns about immigration have been amplified by the 2015 refugee crisis. 
The decision of the German and Swedish governments to accept a large number of 
refugees has encountered considerable opposition at home and contributed to the 
growing success of far-right parties that have campaigned on an anti-immigrant 
platform. Second, these countries depict the three worlds of welfare capitalism (Esping-
Andersen, 1990). The institutional structure of the welfare regimes may influence how 
the public perceives the link between immigration and welfare spending. Thus, although 
our theoretical argument suggests that the negative framing of immigration will reduce 
support for higher spending everywhere, it is possible that the level of support will vary 
across the welfare regimes. The universal welfare regime in Sweden allows immigrants 
comparatively easy access to benefits. This characteristic may generate perceptions that 
immigrants benefit disproportionately from the welfare state and thus generate higher 
levels of opposition to greater spending (c.f. Fietkau and Hansen, 2018; Hjorth, 2016) 
than in the other two countries. The criteria for accessing benefits for immigrants are 
stricter in Germany and the UK.  Germany’s insurance-based regime is also less 
generous to those who did not pay into the system, while the UK’s liberal regime is less 
generous overall.  
Our analysis shows a strong effect of the negative framing of immigration on 
support for welfare spending in all three countries. Although there is some evidence 
that this effect is amplified for people who hold anti-immigrant and anti-welfare 
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attitudes or feel insecure about their financial prospects, on the whole negative framing 
applies generally across the population. As expected, the effect of positive framing is 
significantly weaker and does not strengthen support in any of our countries.  We also 
find differences in the size of the effect across countries that are in line with our 
reasoning about the influence of regime types. 
These findings have clear implications for the politics of welfare reforms in 
Europe. They suggest that, as long as immigration remains one of the key issues in 
national politics, it might be much easier to foster coalitions that support welfare state 
retrenchment than coalitions that support further expansion of the welfare state. 
 
1. Immigration and support for welfare spending 
 
Since the publication of Alesina and Glaeser’s seminal book (2004), there has been 
increased academic interest in the relationship between immigration and the welfare 
state. Alesina and Glaeser argued that racial and ethnic heterogeneity in the US 
undermines support for redistribution and is the main reason why the US does not have 
a generous welfare state. Minorities, they maintain, are seen as benefiting 
disproportionately from the welfare state and thus it is difficult to build solidarity and 
broad-based support for redistribution.  
Although this argument about the trade off between heterogeneity and 
redistribution has received strong empirical support in the US, the findings for Europe 
have been less clear. While some studies find that race or ethnicity matter for welfare 
support (Harell et al, 2016), others suggest a mediating impact of different political and 
economic institutions (Larsen, 2011; Mau and Burkhardt, 2009). Commonly, the 
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literature examines how the stock or flow of immigrant populations affects aggregate 
support for the welfare state. The findings are far from consistent. Some analyses find 
evidence of negative effects of increased immigration on support for redistribution 
(Dahlberg et al, 2012; Eger, 2010, Schmidt-Catran and Spies, 2016; Senik et al, 2008). 
Others find some support for the compensation hypothesis, which posits that higher 
immigration provokes feelings of economic insecurity which increases support for 
welfare spending (Brady and Finningan, 2014; Burgoon et al, 2012; Finseraas, 2008).  
A common denominator of these studies is their reliance on cross-sectional data, 
which largely leaves unspecified the causal mechanisms behind individual attitude 
formation. More recent scholarship has tried to address this criticism by turning to 
survey experiments. These studies undertake a more explicit test of the effect of 
information about immigration on individual attitudes about the welfare state (Alesina 
et al, 2018; Naumann and Stoetzer, 2017, Runst, 2017). However, in most cases the 
focus is still on the effect of the size of the immigrant population on welfare state 
support.1 Respondents are typically asked to evaluate the number of immigrants or 
primed with the correct number of immigrants, and then asked about their support for 
the various aspects of the welfare state. On the whole, these experimental studies find 
no direct uniform effect of immigration on support for redistribution, although they 
suggest that the effect may vary according to income, education or the exposure to 
labour market risks (Naumann and Stoetzer, 2017; Runst, 2017).  
One potential reason for why these studies find no strong effect of immigration is 
that respondents may not see an immediate link between immigration and 
                                                             
1 Alesina et al (2018) also examine the effect of immigrants’ origin and work ethic. Similarly, 
Ford (2016) examines how attitudes towards the level of benefits are affected by information 
about recipients’ ethnic and religious background. 
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redistribution. Even if they are made aware of the number of immigrants in their 
country, they may perceive that number differently or may not find that information 
immediately relevant when answering the question about their support for 
redistribution. We argue that a more appropriate assessment of the effects of 
immigration on welfare state support is to confront respondents with more direct 
information about the economic costs and benefits of immigration. An explicit mention 
of immigrants’ fiscal impact is more likely to trigger considerations about the welfare 
state, whether that be the sustainability of the welfare state (socio-tropic concerns) or 
higher taxes and competition for welfare services (self-interest). Political actors and the 
media are aware that this type of information elicits strong responses and use it 
frequently when addressing the public. Indeed, as Alesina and Glaeser (2004) have 
shown in the case of the US, information about the costs of different ethnic groups has 
been used instrumentally by conservative politicians and media outlets to activate 
natives’ racial prejudices, undermine redistributive policies and mobilize political 
support.2  Far right parties in Europe have relied on a similar strategy and tried to 
portray immigrants as exploiting the welfare system.  
Information about the costs/benefits of immigration is more likely to be 
consequential than information about the number of immigrants not only because it 
makes the link between immigration and redistribution more transparent, but also 
because it is often presented through valenced frames. Such frames indicate a clear 
standpoint and emphasize either negative or positive aspects of an issue. We know from 
research in psychology and communication studies that valenced frames tend to be 
                                                             
2 It is important to recognize that some of these prejudices exist prior to such information. 
Previous research shows that some individuals are particularly biased towards minorities and 
that, in addition to economic concerns (Malhotra et al, 2013; Schmidt-Catran and Spies, 2016), 
ethnocentrism (Harell et al, 2016) and cultural concerns (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Sides 
and Citrin, 2007; Valentino et al, 2017) shape attitudes towards immigrants.  
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more effective in influencing attitudes than neutral frames because they present 
information in a more accessible way (Baumeister et al, 2001; Chong and Druckman, 
2007). Political actors and the media regularly rely on valenced frames when discussing 
the economic effects of immigration. Depending on the source and the methodology 
used, immigration has been portrayed as either being a drain on the budget and public 
services or having a positive net fiscal contribution. Yet, we know little about the effects 
of such frames on citizens’ attitudes. Does information about the economic 
consequences of immigration affect attitudes towards redistribution and the welfare 
state? And does valence of the frames matter? The next section outlines our theoretical 
reasoning and the hypotheses we test through the survey experiment. 
 
2. Framing effects and negativity bias 
 
Research on public opinion has shown that how political actors and the media frame 
their communication is consequential for citizens’ attitudes. We know that citizens’ 
perceptions are affected by the way in which the media describes an issue, policy or 
candidate (Chong & Druckman, 2007b; Gross, 2008). For example, a hate group rally is 
perceived more favourably if it is framed in terms of free speech rather than as a threat 
to public safety (Nelson et al, 1997a). Attitudes towards government spending for the 
poor depend on how consequences of such policies are represented (Sniderman and 
Theriault, 2004), while support for aggregate government spending depends on 
whether support is framed in general or specific terms (Jacoby, 2000).  
Different mechanisms have been identified to explain the effect of framing on 
public opinion. The information in a frame may induce learning and subsequently 
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change an individual’s opinion on policy. Alternatively, a frame may emphasize certain 
considerations of an issue or policy, thus increasing their weight and making them more 
relevant. Finally, the media and political actors may also prime an issue to bring 
associated beliefs to the forefront of consideration (Haynes et al, 2016).  
While this research has demonstrated that frames have a powerful effect on 
public opinion, the focus has been predominantly on issue frames. Such frames typically 
include different content and thus make it difficult to separate the effects of that content 
from the effects of valence alone (positive vs negative) (Boydstun et al, 2017). Yet, in 
competitive democracies citizens are often exposed to valenced frames that do not 
necessarily emphasize different aspects of an issue, but simply contain conflicting 
information that stress either positive or negative consequences. 
Information on the fiscal impact of immigration is one such case. For example, in 
the UK citizens have been exposed to conflicting messages from different media outlets. 
While the Guardian cited a study which argues that immigrants contributed GBP 20 
billion more in taxes than they received in welfare payments over ten years (4 
November 2014), the Daily Mail referred to a study that claims that the annual net cost 
of immigrants is GBP 17 billion (17 May 2016). Similarly, in Germany some outlets have 
emphasized that each foreigner contributes EUR 3,300 more in taxes and premiums 
than they get in terms of state support (Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 27 November 2014), 
while others have reported that on average each foreigner represents a net cost of EUR 
1,800 (Bild, 1 February 2015).3  
How do citizens respond to such valenced frames? Drawing on research from 
                                                             
3 The differences in estimates are due to different assumptions used in calculations, but this is 
rarely discussed sufficiently in communications aimed at the general public. 
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psychology and behavioural science, and in particular the notion of negativity bias, we 
argue that the effects of such valenced frames are assymetric and that negative frames 
have a stronger impact on citizens’ attitudes than positive frames. Psychologists have 
shown that under many conditions, humans have an innate predisposition to attend to 
valence and to give greater weight to negative than positive information (Baumeister et 
al. 2001; Rozin and Royzman, 2001). Since Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979, 1981) 
seminal work on prospect theory, which suggests that negative frames are more 
powerful than positive frames in shaping people’s judgements, a vast multidisciplinary 
literature has demonstrated this principle in a range of domains. For example, public 
perceptions of the economy have been shown to be affected more strongly by negative 
than positive economic news coverage (Soroka, 2006). Job placement programmes are 
evaluated more positively when they are discussed in terms of their success rate rather 
than their failure rate (Davis and Bobko, 1986). Negative information has been also 
shown to have a greater role with respect to evaluation of U.S. presidential candidates 
and political parties as well as voter turnout (Holbrook et al, 2001). Similarly, negative 
political advertising has a stronger effect than positive advertising and people tend to 
remember it longer (Johnson-Cartee and Copland, 1991).  
There are several explanations for this evident presence of negativity bias. Some 
theories posit that negativity bias is a built-in predisposition or an inherent 
characteristic in the central nervous system. The desire for survival implies that 
humans may be genetically predisposed to pay more attention to negative events. In 
this line of reasoning, some accounts suggest that negativity bias operates automatically 
at an early (evaluative-categorization) stage of reasoning (Ito et al. 1998). Others argue 
that negative information is more potent because of the much lower frequency of 
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negative than positive events (Lewick et al, 1992). Yet others emphasize the contagion 
effect and argue that negative events and information “ may inherently be more 
contagious, generalize more to neighboring domains, and be more resistant to 
elimination” (Rozin and Royzman, 2001: 315). The different possible reasons 
notwithstanding, extensive empirical studies have demonstrated the dominance of 
negativity bias and the fact that negative information is more salient and more 
memorable. We therefore expect that: 
H1: The effects of the negative framing of immigration will be more powerful 
than the effects of the positive framing and thus have a greater impact on welfare 
attitudes.  
More specifically, we expect that: 
H2a: Respondents exposed to the negative framing of immigration show 
significantly less support for welfare spending than those in the control group, 
i.e. those not exposed to any information about immigration. 
People who receive information about the fiscal costs of immigration should be 
more likely to perceive immigrants as being the main beneficiaries of the welfare 
system. This should lead to reduced aggregate support for welfare spending either 
because of reduced solidarity towards the out group or because of self-interest as the 
net fiscal burden of immigration may be associated with potentially higher taxes.  
If negative information about immigration generates lower support for welfare 
spending relative to the control group, should we expect a reverse effect of positive 
information? Two reasons lead us to believe that this is unlikely to be the case and that 
the effects of positive information should be negligible. The first is associated with the 
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literature on negativity bias, which suggests that positive frames are weaker, less 
memorable, and thus less likely to shape attitudes. The second is related to the more 
recent literature in psychology that examines the effects of the sequencing of positive 
and negative messages. This literature shows that negative frames tend to be stickier 
than positive frames. They lodge in people’s mind for longer, so reframing from negative 
to positive is more difficult than the other way around (Ledgerwood & Boydstun, 2014; 
Boydstun et al, 2017; Sparks & Ledgerwood, 2017). Because immigration is such a 
salient topic in advanced countries, our respondents are likely to already have 
encountered some messages about the fiscal impact of immigration (Allen and Blinder, 
2013). If negative information is indeed more memorable and stickier than positive 
information, then respondents who were previously exposed primarily to messages that 
emphasize the negative fiscal impact of immigration may find it more difficult to believe 
subsequent information that immigrants contribute more to the welfare system than 
they take out. Correspondingly, we hypothesize that:  
H2b: Respondents exposed to the positive framing of immigration do not show a 
significantly stronger support for welfare spending than the control group. 
It is important to note here that our understanding of the framing effect is not the 
same as persuasion via belief change. As Nelson et al (1997b) show, although the two 
concepts are related, they differ both theoretically and empirically. Persuasion via belief 
change is evident when respondents believe the information that is discrepant with 
their prior attitude, and which then leads them to change their attitudes accordingly. 
The underlying rationale is that such information affects opinion because it is new and 
thus not already part of the respondents’ knowledge or convictions. In contrast, framing 
effects cannot be reduced to new information only. Instead, frames also “operate by 
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activating information already at the recipients’ disposal, stored in long term memory” 
(ibid, 225). Frames, therefore, may not always offer new information, but they influence 
people’s weighting of different considerations and the perceived relevance of a 
particular belief for policy attitudes. This conceptualization of framing effects can be 
verified empirically. If memory activation was not part of the framing effects, the effect 
of our negative framing would be evident only among those respondents who had no 
previous exposure to negative information about the costs of immigration. While the 
lack of resources prevented us from exposing our respondents to such information 
prior to the experiment, data on newspaper readership offer a reasonable proxy for 
previous exposure. Controlling for readership of newspapers that tend to propagate an 
anti-immigration sentiment, we find no appreciable difference in the magnitude of the 
framing effects across the two groups (see Table A12 of the online appendix). This 
confirms the idea that the framing effect entails weighting of both new and previously 
acquired information and it is not simply belief change due to new information. 
 
2. 1 Moderating effects 
The framing literature tells us that the strength of the frame is an important 
determinant of its effectiveness (Chong and Druckman, 2007). Frames providing clear 
and unambiguous information are more easily accessible and thus more likely to be 
consequential for attitude formation. Because a statement about the fiscal impact of 
immigration represents a strong frame and makes the link between immigration and 
redistribution immediately obvious, we expect to see clear effects of this frame at the 
aggregate level.  
However, it is possible that this effect may be further amplified by strong pre-
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existing attitudes or characteristics. As Chong and Druckman (2007b: 120) argue, 
“individuals who possess strong attitudes are not only more likely to recognize which 
side of an issue is consistent with their values, but they are also more likely to engage in 
motivated reasoning”, which includes an inclination to evaluate new information in a 
way that supports their preconception and to devalue contrary evidence. Two types of 
such strong attitudes seem especially important for our study – anti-immigrant and 
anti-welfare attitudes. Individuals with such attitudes should be particularly susceptible 
to our negative frame that emphasizes the fiscal costs of immigration. Those who have 
clear anti-immigrant attitudes are more likely to believe information that immigrants 
are benefiting disproportionately from the welfare state and this is likely to further 
strengthen those attitudes. Consequently, they should be less likely to support further 
welfare spending. Similarly, among respondents who receive the negative frame, those 
who are already critical about the size of the welfare state should be especially reluctant 
to support an expansion of welfare benefits because such frame further reinforces their 
believes that welfare costs are too high or that many people on benefits are not 
deserving. We believe that these attitudes capture better cognitive considerations and 
are thus more consequential than simple categories such as education, income or 
political leaning.  
In addition, we consider expectations about economic prospects as another 
factor that may moderate the effect of our framing. Individuals who are worried about 
their economic prospects are more likely to end up being dependent on the welfare 
state and thus may see immigrants as competition for scarce resources. Theoretically, 
however, it is unclear whether such circumstances should amplify the effect of our 
negative framing. On the one hand, such individuals may support greater spending as 
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they expect that they will need to rely on the welfare state more heavily in the future. 
On the other hand, they may be less supportive of welfare spending if they perceive 
immigrants as non-deserving or believe that a leaner welfare state would be less 
attractive to immigrants, which in turn might help reduce the perceived competition for 
welfare.  
 
3. The survey experiment 
 
To test how the framing of the impact of immigration affects support for welfare 
spending, we conducted survey experiments in Germany, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom. Our experiments were embedded in YouGov’s regular Omnibus surveys. The 
surveys are administered online and respondents are recruited from YouGov’s panels of 
800,000 members in the UK, 320,000 in Germany, and 100,000 in Sweden. The samples 
drawn from these panels are representative of the national population based on age, 
region, gender, education, political interest, and voting behaviour at the last election. 
Respondents are selected using Active Sampling to ensure that only those contacted are 
able to access the survey. The final sample sizes are 3,269 in the UK, 4,158 in Germany, 
and 2,001 in Sweden. The smaller sample size in Sweden reflects the difficulty and cost 
of obtaining a large sample in a country with smaller population. The surveys were 
fielded between 9th and 12 June 2017 in the UK, 14th and 17th August 2017 in Germany, 
and 22nd to 29th September 2017 in Sweden.4 
                                                             
4 The study was deemed to be “minimal risk” under the terms of the ethical assessment 
procedure at [university name] (see p. 32 of the online appendix for further detail). Following 
the survey, all respondents were made aware that they were part of a survey experiment. 
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For the main experiment, all individuals were primed with neutral information 
to prompt them into thinking about how the welfare state is funded and the relationship 
between taxation and welfare spending: 
 
(Priming information): The government provides a range of social benefits and 
services to address the needs associated with unemployment, sickness, education, housing, 
family circumstances, and retirement. Such benefits and services are financed through 
taxation and national insurance and all legal residents in [country name] are entitled to 
receive them. To spend more on social benefits and services, the government may need to 
increase taxes and national insurance contributions.  
 
Individuals were then randomized into three groups. The first group received the 
information that framed the economic impact of immigration on the welfare state in a 
negative light:  
 
(Negative frame): Because immigrants are also entitled to receive social benefits 
and use public services, the economic implications of immigration are an 
increasing concern.  Recent research shows that immigration is a drain on 
government finances – on average, immigrants take out significantly more from 
the welfare state in social benefits and services than they contribute in taxes and 
national insurance.  
The second group received exactly the opposite information: 
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(Positive frame): Because immigrants are also entitled to receive social benefits 
and use public services, the economic implications of immigration are an 
increasing concern.  However, recent research shows that immigration is in fact a 
boost to government finances – on average, immigrants contribute significantly 
more to the welfare state in taxes and national insurance than they take out in 
social benefits and services. 
 
The final group serves as our control group and received only the priming information.  
Every group was then asked our dependent variable question. Previous research 
has shown that when individuals are asked about increasing social spending without 
being made aware of the potential costs, then support for spending tends to be 
overstated ( Margalit, 2013). We therefore assess support for social spending by 
referring to the potential costs of any increase. The following question, with five 
possible responses ranging from “strongly support” to “strongly oppose”, serves as our 
dependent variable: 
 
Do you support an increase in government spending on social benefits and services 
even if this may lead to higher taxes?  
 
The treatment groups therefore differ only in the framing information that they 
received. Randomization ensures that all three groups are nearly identical (see Tables 
A6-A8) in all other respects in terms of observable and unobservable variables that may 
confound cross-group comparison.  
Strong pre-existing attitudes regarding immigrants and welfare spending more 
broadly may amplify the effect of our frames. Similarly, those who are less economically 
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secure may view immigrants as competitors for welfare benefits. We therefore placed, 
prior to the treatment, three additional questions on the survey to investigate the 
conditional effect of our frames. The wording for each of these questions was inspired 
by survey experiments undertaken by Ford (2016) and Margalit (2013). The first 
question measures the extent to which individuals hold anti-welfare preferences that 
may amplify negative information regarding the welfare state.5 The second question is 
aimed at assessing pre-existing anti-immigrant attitudes.6 The final question is designed 
to examine whether economic insecurity could moderate our treatment effects.7  
 
4. Results 
 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of support for increased welfare spending. The 
dependent variable has been recoded into three categories to simplify the presentation 
of our results and make the graphs more readable.8 Figure 1 shows that there is 
substantial variation in support for increased welfare spending both between countries 
and between treatment groups. In general, support for increased spending is highest in 
the UK and lowest in Sweden. At first glance, this may be surprising given what we 
know about the respective welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990). However, our 
                                                             
5 To what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement: Many people who receive 
welfare benefits don’t really deserve any help (a five point scale ranging from strongly agree to 
strongly disagree). 
6 On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 stands for “would not mind at all” and 10 stands for “would 
mind a great deal”, please say how much would you mind or not mind: (a) living next door to an 
immigrant family?, (b) working with immigrants?  
7 Looking forward to the next 12 months, how confident do you feel about being able to keep 
your current job? (1. Very confident  2. Confident  3. Slightly confident  4. Not confident  5. Not 
employed at the moment) 
8 In addition, methodological concerns have informed this decision. Specifically, in our 
interaction models cell sizes at the tails (strongly support and strongly oppose) for particular 
attitudes are very small. For example, in the UK in the negative group among those who hold 
anti-welfare attitudes, only 20 respondents strongly support increased spending.  
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question asks respondents if they favor increased spending even if it leads to higher 
taxes. In Sweden, welfare expenditure is already high at 27.1 percent of GDP, compared 
to 21.5 percent in the UK and 25.3% in Germany.9 Therefore, it is possible that Swedish 
respondents broadly believe that spending is high enough already, while UK 
respondents believe that there is greater capacity for increased expenditure. In 
addition, the UK has the lowest income tax in all categories of income, and hence the 
prospect of higher taxes as a price for increased spending may not appear so 
unacceptable.10 In any case, this should not affect our substantive results since we are 
concerned with how framing changes support for spending rather than the prevalence 
of support for increased expenditure in general. 
 
 
Figure 1: Support for increased social spending by treatment group.11 
                                                             
9 OECD (2018), Social spending (indicator). doi: 10.1787/7497563b-en (Accessed on 15 June 
2018) 
10 See “Tax on test: Do Britons pay more than most”, Guardian, 27 May 2017. 
11 Stata graph schemes designed by Bischof (2017). 
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While there is a clear difference in the overall level of support for increased 
welfare spending across the three countries, the pattern of support across the treatment 
groups within countries is remarkably similar. Figure 1 also shows that respondents in 
the control group were more likely to support an increase in spending in each country. 
The difference between the control group and the negative treatment group is largest in 
the UK at 13 percentage points. In Sweden the difference is 11 points and in Germany 6 
points. This provides preliminary support for our hypothesis that negative framing of 
the impact of immigration leads to reduced support for welfare spending. It is also 
noticeable that individuals in the positive treatment group in each country have lower 
levels of support for increased spending than the control group. This may indicate that 
even a mere mention of immigration triggers considerations that reduce welfare 
support. This is an interesting outcome though at this stage, it is unclear whether the 
level of support for increased spending among the positive treatment group is 
significantly different to that of the control group. In the next section we turn to a more 
formal test of our hypotheses. 
 
4.1 Regression models 
To formally test our hypotheses, we regressed our dependent variable on a categorical 
indicator of a respondent’s treatment group. The control group is specified as the 
reference category. As the dependent variable is categorical, we use an ordered logit 
model with poststratification weights. Given the experimental protocol and the fact that 
our samples are weighted to be representative, spurious correlation is unlikely to be a 
problem in our models. We therefore follow advice by Mutz (2011, Ch. 7) to keep the 
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model simple and not to include control variables.12 In subsequent models, which 
examine the moderating effects of pre-existing attitudes, we interact those attitudes 
with the treatment. The models are specified as follows:   
 
𝑌𝑖
∗ =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃 +  𝜀𝑖  
 
with 𝑌𝑖
∗ capturing individuals’ support for increased welfare spending, 𝑖 indexing 
individuals, and 𝜀𝑖 representing an error term. To examine the conditional effect of pre-
existing attitudes on our treatments, additional models are estimated containing the 
interaction terms 𝛽2𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃 × 𝐴𝑁𝑇𝐼-𝑊𝐸𝐿𝐹𝐴𝑅𝐸, 
𝛽3𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃 × 𝐴𝑁𝑇𝐼-𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁, and 𝛽4𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃 ×
𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑂𝑀𝐼𝐶 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌. The interaction models also contain all constitutive terms. 
Separate models are estimated for each country. The results can be found in Tables 1-3.  
  
                                                             
12 The results hold when standard controls are included in the models (see table A1 in the online 
appendix). 
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Table 1: Immigration Framing and Support for Redistribution in Germany 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
No frame (ref.)     
   Negative frame -0.37*** -0.14 -0.36*** -0.26** 
 (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) 
   Positive frame -0.14 -0.05 -0.10 -0.12 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) 
Anti-welfare  -0.62***   
  (0.10)   
Negative frame X Anti-
welfare 
 -0.49**   
  (0.15)   
Positive frame X Anti-
welfare 
 -0.20   
  (0.14)   
Anti-immigrant   -0.56***  
   (0.12)  
Negative frame X Anti-
immigrant 
  -0.05  
   (0.18)  
Positive frame X Anti-
immigrant 
  -0.18  
   (0.18)  
Economic insecurity    0.18 
    (0.10) 
Negative frame X 
Economic insecurity 
   -0.29 
    (0.15) 
Positive frame X 
Economic insecurity 
   -0.02 
    (0.14) 
cut1     
Constant -0.60*** -0.91*** -0.73*** -0.52*** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
cut2     
Constant 0.72*** 0.46*** 0.60*** 0.79*** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
N 4158 4158 4158 4158 
AIC 2.18 2.12 2.16 2.18 
BIC -25575.8 -25773.7 -25637.2 -25557.5 
Ordered logit regressions, coefficients are log odds with standard errors in parentheses.  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 2: Immigration Framing and Support for Redistribution in Sweden 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
No frame (ref.)     
   Negative frame -0.61*** -0.50*** -0.50*** -0.56*** 
 (0.11) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) 
   Positive frame -0.22* -0.19 -0.04 -0.10 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Anti-welfare  -1.40***   
  (0.17)   
Negative frame X Anti-welfare  -0.60*   
  (0.27)   
Positive frame X Anti-welfare  -0.40   
  (0.24)   
Anti-immigrant   -0.59***  
   (0.17)  
Negative frame X Anti-
immigrant 
  -0.59*  
   (0.28)  
Positive frame X Anti-
immigrant 
  -0.59*  
   (0.24)  
Economic insecurity    0.13 
    (0.16) 
Negative frame X Economic 
insecurity 
   -0.13 
    (0.23) 
Positive frame X Economic 
insecurity 
   -0.31 
    (0.22) 
cut1     
Constant -0.50*** -1.09*** -0.68*** -0.45*** 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) 
cut2     
Constant 0.78*** 0.37*** 0.65*** 0.83*** 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
N 2001 2001 2001 2001 
AIC 2.16 1.99 2.11 2.16 
BIC -10863.6 -11186.8 -10951.9 -10843.1 
Ordered logit regressions, coefficients are log odds with standard errors in parentheses.  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 3: Immigration Framing and Support for Redistribution in the UK 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
No frame (ref.)     
   Negative frame -0.63*** -0.47*** -0.48*** -0.42*** 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) 
   Positive frame -0.14 -0.17 -0.16 -0.12 
 (0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) 
Anti-welfare  -1.11***   
  (0.13)   
Negative frame X Anti-
welfare 
 -0.55**   
  (0.19)   
Positive frame X Anti-
welfare 
 -0.07   
  (0.18)   
Anti-immigrant   -0.80***  
   (0.13)  
Negative frame X Anti-
immigrant 
  -0.64**  
   (0.20)  
Positive frame X Anti-
immigrant 
  0.07  
   (0.18)  
Economic insecurity    0.55*** 
    (0.13) 
Negative frame X Economic 
insecurity 
   -0.52** 
    (0.18) 
Positive frame X Economic 
insecurity 
   -0.11 
    (0.17) 
cut1     
Constant -0.94*** -1.49*** -1.27*** -0.72*** 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
cut2     
Constant 0.09 -0.35*** -0.18* 0.32*** 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
N 3269 3269 3269 3269 
AIC 2.10 1.99 2.04 2.09 
BIC -19557.2 -19906.7 -19744.6 -19570.7 
Ordered logit regressions, coefficients are log odds with standard errors in parentheses.  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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The main models (models 1, 5, and 9) show that negative framing of immigration is 
associated with reduced support for greater welfare spending in all countries. Figure 2 
depicts the predicted probabilities of supporting or opposing greater spending for the 
different groups. The differences between the negative frame and the control group are 
stark in each country. In Germany, individuals in the negative treatment group have a 
44 percent probability of opposing increased spending, compared to 36 percent in the 
control group. The differences are even greater in Sweden (53 vs. 38 percent) and the 
UK (42 vs. 28 percent). These results provide strong support for H2(a). Individuals that 
received the negative framing concerning the impact of immigration on the welfare 
state are much less likely to support greater spending than respondents that received 
no framing. This figure also suggests some cross-country differences in the level of 
support for greater spending within the negative frame group. In line with the 
reasoning about the impact of welfare regimes outlined in the introduction, Sweden 
leads the way with over half of respondents in this group unwilling to support greater 
spending.  
The results also provide some support for H2(b). Drawing on the literature on 
negativity bias, we expected that positive framing of the impact of immigration would 
be weaker than negative framing. This is because negative information tends to be more 
salient and memorable than positive information (Ledgerwood & Boydstun, 2014; 
Boydstun et al, 2017; Sparks & Ledgerwood, 2017). Given the salience of immigration as 
an issue in contemporary politics, we also expected that respondents would already 
have encountered some negative messages concerning the impact of immigration. As 
negative messages tend to be stickier, overturning them with positive information can 
be challenging.  
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Figure 2: Predicted probability of opposition or support for increased welfare 
spending by treatment group. 
 
Figure 2 shows that, as expected, the positive frame is weaker than the negative 
frame in all countries.13 In addition, individuals in the positive treatment group are less 
likely to support increased welfare spending and more likely to oppose it than 
respondents in the control group. However, it is important to note that this difference in 
support for increased spending between the positive treatment group and the control 
                                                             
13 We refer to the results in terms of predicted probabilities in this paper. Marginal effects for 
the negative and positive treatment groups are available in the online appendix in Figures A1 to 
A4. 
27 
 
group is statistically significant only in Sweden (see tables 1-3). That positive 
information about the impact of immigration can reduce support for welfare spending 
may seem anomalous. However, cultural and economic factors (Hainmueller and Hiscox 
2007; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015; Sides and Citrin 2007) as well as prior media 
coverage of immigration are likely to play a role in shaping how individuals perceive the 
impact of migrants. Previous research has shown that immigration is usually presented 
in an overtly negative way in the media which can lead to individuals developing 
negative priors about migrants (Abrajano et al, 2017; Alesina et al 2018; Allen & 
Blinder, 2013). As these negative messages tend to be more powerful due to negativity 
bias, it is conceivable that even the use of the term ‘immigrants’ in a positive context 
may trigger a negative response among respondents. Further support for this 
proposition can be found in studies of the electoral performance of anti-immigrant 
political parties. They show that simple exposure to media coverage of immigration-
related stories – whether positive or negative in context – increases support for anti-
immigration parties (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart, 2007; Burscher et al, 2015).  
Although this is a plausible explanation, it is possible that the negative effect of 
the positive treatment is a methodological artifact in the sense that the positive frame 
may not have been perceived as such. The pairwise contrasts of the treatment 
coefficients (Table A2 in the online appendix) suggest that this is not the case and 
confirm that the effects of the negative and positive treatments are distinct from each 
other in all cases.  
 Two further tests were used to examine if the positive frame may not be 
perceived as positive. The first was a pre-test survey using a convenience sample of 
students undertaken at [University name redacted for review]. 69 percent of those who 
received the negative frame believed that it was accurate, compared to 66 percent of 
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those who received the positive frame. Since students generally display more pro-
immigrant attitudes, we would expect the difference in the perceptions of the accuracy 
of these frames to be even more evident in the broader population. But since our sample 
in this pre-test was small (79 students), we have also undertaken a post-experiment 
manipulation check in the UK to verify if the positive treatment was perceived as such.14 
Respondents in each treatment group were subjected to the same experimental 
protocol as set out above. An additional question was added at the end of the 
experiment, asking whether respondents believe that immigrants contribute more in 
taxes than they receive from the welfare state. The results of the manipulation check 
can be found in Table 4. They show clear differences between the positive and negative 
treatment groups. 42.3 percent of respondents who received the negative frame stated 
that they believe immigrants contribute more than they cost compared to 53.7 percent 
of those in the positive frame group. A formal test of these differences can be found in 
Table A3 of the online appendix. The results of this logit model show that respondents 
in the negative frame group are significantly less likely to believe that immigrants 
contribute more than they cost than those in the positive frame group. These results 
lead us to conclude that both the negative and positive frames were both correctly 
perceived by respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
14 Lack of funding prevented us from doing the same checks in Germany and Sweden. 
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Table 4. Manipulation check frequencies (%) 
  Negative frame Positive frame No frame 
No 57.73 46.28 54.15 
Yes 42.27 53.72 45.85 
N 440 430 434 
Note: Respondents were asked the following question: “Do you believe that, on average, 
immigrants contribute more in taxes and national insurance than they receive in 
benefits and services from the welfare state?” 
No, Immigrants cost more than they contribute 
Yes, immigrants contribute more than they cost 
Fieldwork carried out by YouGov, February 20th-21st 2019. 
 
 
Overall, we find support for each of our hypotheses. Negative frames are more 
powerful than positive frames (H1). The results also show that negative framing of the 
impact of immigration reduces support for increased welfare spending (H2(a)), but 
positive framing has little effect (H2(b)). In the next section we consider the conditional 
impact of our treatments. 
 
4.2 The conditional effect of negative framing 
 
While the results presented above provide strong support for our theoretical argument, 
it is possible that the effect of negative framing could be stronger for individuals that 
hold specific beliefs about welfare and immigration. The first conditional effect we 
consider is whether individuals hold anti-welfare attitudes.15 Some people believe that 
welfare benefits are intrinsically wrong and that many benefit claimants are 
undeserving. It is likely that these individuals will be more susceptible to negative 
framing as it will reinforce their belief that many people unjustly claim benefits. We 
                                                             
15 We choose to consider the different interactions in separate models to simplify the 
interpretation of the results. The results presented in this section are not appreciably different 
in models that combine all the interactions. 
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therefore interacted our treatment group variable with the binary indicator of anti-
welfare attitudes.16  
The results can be found in models 2, 6, and 10 of Tables 1-3. The interaction 
terms in these models are all negative and statistically significant for the respondents 
that received the negative frame. This supports our argument that negative frames will 
be more powerful. As the results from the positive frame group are not significantly 
different from those of the control group, and in order to enhance the clarity of the 
graphs, Figures 3, 4, and 5 contain only the results for the negative frame group and the 
control group. To further ensure that the graphs are readable, we only plot the 
predicted probabilities for opposition to welfare spending.  
Figure 3 shows the predicted probabilities of opposing increased welfare 
spending depending on an individual’s pre-existing welfare attitudes. In comparison to 
the control group, respondents exposed to the negative frame always have a higher 
probability of opposing increased welfare spending. However, as Figure 3 suggests, this 
difference in probability between the treatment and control group is much more 
pronounced for respondents holding anti-welfare attitudes. The likelihood of opposing 
welfare spending for this group is also always substantially higher than for respondents 
who do not hold anti-welfare attitudes.  For example, in Germany individuals who 
received the negative frame and hold anti-welfare attitudes have a 59 percent 
probability opposing increased welfare spending, compared to 32 percent for those who 
hold no such attitudes.  
 
                                                             
16 This scale from the original question has been recoded into a binary variable. Responses 
“Strongly agree” and “Agree” are coded 1; all other responses are coded 0. The results using the 
original scale are not substantively different to those presented in this paper. A graph of the 
results can be found in Figure A8 of the online appendix. 
31 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Predicted probability of opposition to increased welfare spending in 
the negative treatment group conditional on pro/anti-welfare attitudes 
 
 
It is also likely that people who hold negative predispositions towards 
immigrants will be more receptive to negative framing regarding the impact of 
immigration. To examine this, we interacted a dummy capturing anti-immigrant 
attitudes with our treatment group indicator.17 Figure 4 shows that the probability that 
                                                             
17 This dummy captures the average response to the two questions gauging anti-immigrant 
attitudes (see footnote 6). Only respondents scoring more than 5 on this scale are considered to 
hold anti-immigrant attitudes. The results using the original scale are not substantively different 
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an individual in the negative treatment group will oppose higher welfare spending 
increases substantially for those harboring anti-immigrant attitudes. However, as 
models 3, 7, and 11 in the tables show, this interaction is significant in Sweden and the 
UK, but not in Germany. This indicates that in Sweden and the UK the effect of the 
negative treatment is further amplified for respondents who hold anti-immigrant views. 
In all three countries, opposition to welfare spending is higher among those that hold 
anti-immigrant views regardless of whether they were in the negative frame or control 
group. In each country, individuals who received the negative frame were more likely to 
oppose increased spending if they also held pro-immigrant views. These results indicate 
that negative framing increases opposition to social spending among both pro- and anti-
immigration individuals though the size of the effect is greater among those that hold 
anti-immigrant attitudes in Sweden and the UK. Figure A3 in the online appendix 
provides further evidence of this result, showing the marginal effect of negative framing 
conditional on an individual’s pre-existing attitudes towards immigrants.  
 
 
                                                             
to those presented in this paper. A graph of the results can be found in Figure A9 of the online 
appendix. 
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Figure 4: Predicted probability of opposition to increased welfare spending in 
the negative treatment group conditional on attitudes towards immigrants 
 
 
Finally, if individuals are currently facing or expecting economic insecurity in the 
future, they may view immigrants as competition for welfare resources. Economically 
insecure respondents thus may be more susceptible to the negative frame. The results 
of the interaction between the dummy capturing economic insecurity and the treatment 
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variable can be found in models 4, 8 and 12 of the tables and are illustrated in Figure 
5.18  
 
 
Figure 5: Predicted probability of opposition to increased welfare spending in 
the negative treatment group conditional on perceived economic insecurity 
 
 
                                                             
18 Those who stated that they are not confident about keeping their current job or are not 
employed are more likely to perceive immigrants as competition and were coded 1, and those 
who said they were either very confident, confident, or slightly confident were coded 0. See 
footnote 7 for the exact question wording. The results using the original scale are not 
substantively different to those presented in this paper. A graph of the results can be found in 
Figure A10 of the online appendix. 
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In Germany and Sweden, the interaction is not statistically significant for any of 
the treatment groups. In contrast, Figure 5 shows that in the UK, among individuals who 
did not receive any frame, those who perceive themselves as economically insecure are 
less likely to oppose increased welfare spending.19 However, for those in the negative 
frame group, perceived economic insecurity does not affect their opposition to welfare 
spending. In effect, the negative framing overrides perceptions of economic insecurity. 
The differences between the UK on one hand, and Germany and Sweden on the other, 
are likely a result of the current welfare generosity and the type of immigration 
experienced in each country. Germany and Sweden have more generous welfare states 
than the UK, which may increase the perception of greater competition for resources in 
the latter. Furthermore, in 2016 Germany introduced stricter rules on the rights of EU 
migrants to access most welfare benefits including requiring that an individual has lived 
in Germany for five years before they can make a claim. Restrictions on migrants’ access 
to the welfare state is likely to have reduced the perception that they represent 
competition to the native population. The nature of immigration could also change 
perceptions of welfare competition in each country. The immigration debate in the UK 
focuses on economic migrants, mainly from EU countries, and the impact that they have 
on the labor market and welfare services including benefits and housing. In Germany 
and Sweden, recent immigration debates have revolved around refugees from Syria and 
Afghanistan. These debates have tended to emphasize the cultural impact of 
immigration rather than the effect on the labor market. However, it is also important to 
note that the economically secure individuals in the negative frame group were also 
more likely to oppose increased welfare spending than economically secure 
                                                             
19 This is particularly the case for the unemployed, as indicated in figure A10. 
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respondents in the control group. Further confirmation of this can be found in Figure A4 
which shows the marginal effect of negative framing conditional on an individual’s 
relative economic security. This suggests that although economic insecurity amplifies 
the effect of the negative framing of immigration, even those who do not face economic 
insecurity are not immune to it.  
Taken together, these results indicate that the effect of negative framing can be 
exacerbated by other attitudes. Individuals that believe welfare claimants are likely to 
be undeserving, and those that hold negative predispositions towards immigrants are 
more likely to oppose increased welfare spending if they received the negative frame in 
our experiment. However, in most instances, negative framing increases opposition to 
welfare spending irrespective of an individual’s pre-existing attitudes and perceptions 
of economic insecurity. The results are also consistent with our theoretical argument: 
the effect of the negative frame of immigration on the welfare state is greater in these 
conditional models than the effect of the positive frame.20  Overall, the results show that 
negativity bias can be a powerful influence on individual level attitudes. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The impact of immigration on politics and society is one of the most salient issues in 
affluent democracies. The increased prominence of radical right parties, and the shifts 
on immigration policy that they have seemingly enforced on mainstream parties, has 
only served to increase the importance of the issue (Abou-Chadi & Krause, 2018). One of 
the central debates surrounding immigration is the impact that it has on government 
                                                             
20 This can be observed in Figures A5-A7 of the online appendix which provide corresponding 
predicted probability plots for the positive frame group. 
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finances, principally via increased pressure on the welfare state. There is no consistent 
evidence regarding the impact of immigration on the welfare state, but the perception 
that immigrants are a strain on the welfare state remains, particularly among 
opponents of immigration.  
In this research, we have tested whether the way that the impact of immigration 
is framed can influence individual level support for welfare spending. Using a survey 
experiment, we randomly assigned individuals in Germany, Sweden, and the UK to 
receive either negative information regarding the impact of immigration, positive 
information, or no information. The results show that while the differences in the level 
of welfare support/opposition may be regime-related, the negative framing significantly 
reduced support for, and increased opposition to, greater welfare spending in all three 
countries. Furthermore, pre-existing anti-welfare and anti-immigrant attitudes amplify 
the effects of negative framing of immigration. However, the positive treatment did not 
increase support for welfare spending in our experiment. 
We argue that the greater power of the negative treatment can be explained by 
negativity bias. Previous research shows that individuals appear to be predisposed to 
give greater weight to negative information (Baumeister et al. 2001; Rozin and 
Royzman, 2001). Moreover, negative information is usually stronger and more 
memorable than positive information (Ledgerwood & Boydstun, 2014; Boydstun et al, 
2017; Sparks & Ledgerwood, 2017). This means that it is both more difficult to overturn 
negative preconceptions and easier to override previously-held positive beliefs.  
While the results support our central argument that negative framing of 
immigration reduces support for welfare spending, it should be noted that we do not 
know if this effect persists over time. Resource limitations prevented the use of a re-
contact study. However, given that negative frames are likely to be stickier and more 
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memorable than positive frames, there is reason to believe that the effects may not be 
transient. 
Another concern is that the findings generated by our survey experiment may 
not reflect perfectly the real world, an issue emphasized by Barabas and Jerrit (2010). 
Our respondents were not made aware of the exact source of information they were 
presented with. In the real world, the source of such information is often evident and it 
may affect its credibility. Using actual newspaper articles or TV reports, rather than 
general framing, would have addressed this concern. However, directly comparable 
information was not readily available. While various articles and reports have 
emphasized either the costs or benefits of immigration, their measures of costs/benefits 
are rarely comparable.21 Since our argument is that negative frames carry more weight 
than positive frames, it was imperative that the information about immigration 
provided to the two treatment groups was identical in everything apart from the 
direction. Consequently, we cannot exclude the possibility that the effects we found 
would be somewhat smaller in the natural setting, but we have no reason to believe that 
the direction of the effect would be very different.  
These results have potentially significant implications for those engaged in 
debates about immigration. It is often believed that engaging with the evidence and 
presenting the generally positive economic impact of immigration will change public 
opinion. However, the tone of the immigration debate is overwhelmingly negative in 
most European countries. As individuals are innately predisposed to negative 
information and afford it greater weight, such positive accounts regarding the impact of 
                                                             
21 Some assessments are based on absolute contribution/cost of immigrants, while others focus 
on their relative contribution vis a vis the natives. Some sources reflect figures for the whole 
immigrant population, while others for the average immigrant. Assumptions underpinning 
calculations are also often different. 
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immigration are easier to discount. This presents a formidable challenge to those on the 
pro-immigration side of the argument. A further implication of this research is that 
support for the welfare state may be more difficult to sustain if opponents consistently 
link together social spending and immigration. If these beliefs become more widely 
held, overturning negative preconceptions about the nature of social expenditure will 
become increasingly difficult which may present a threat to the sustainability of the 
welfare state.  
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